BATTLE NARRATIVE
Toward Tapochau. Saipan: 27 June 1944
The word passed down the line in the darkness: grab your gear, get ready to move out. Riflemen slung their modified combat packs over their shoulders, machine gunners and mortar crews packed up their weapons, and Corporal Robert L. Williams dismantled the parapet of TNT blocks he always built on the lip of his foxhole.[2] The scouts were on the move well before dawn, and Lt. Col. Austin R. Brunelli had his command post on the road by 0530.[3] By units, the 24th Marines arrived in an assembly area near demolished Chacha village and settled in to await further instructions. Ostensibly, they were to advance “on Division order” but their ability to do so depended on the movement of other units.
Once again, the 27th Infantry Division was in the hot seat. The Japanese defending Saipan’s rugged center exacted a terrible toll on the soldiers. Particularly nasty areas earned evocative nicknames – “Hell’s Pocket,” “Death Valley,” and “Purple Heart Ridge” – and indelible memories for those who survived. Individual soldiers and small units fought bravely, but lacked effective and inspiring leadership; on D-plus11, a colonel commanding the 106th Infantry was relieved from duty, and many officers across the Division were under scrutiny for their performance.[4] Furthermore, Japanese troops staged a breakthrough to the south, breaching the lines of the Second Battalion, 105th Infantry at Nafutan Point and raising Cain around Aslito Airfield for several hours before Marine units restored order.[5]
An irritated General Holland M. Smith (USMC) attached a composite Army infantry regiment to the 4th Marine Division to reduce coordination issues between the two branches.[6] This decision helped smooth communications somewhat, but no combination of orders or upper-echelon vitriol could flatten out Saipan’s terrain. The 23rd Marines and the 165th Infantry attacked together as directed, but the line quickly fishhooked backwards as the Marines lunged ahead of the soldiers. “Difficulties of negotiating the terrain and increased opposition” in the Army zone created a bend in the line – a “peculiar situation of being required to cover a left flank for 2500 yards, while a front of the same extent was being held.”[7] By the end of the day, BLT 3-24 was called out of reserve to help fill in the line.
The waiting danger was amply illustrated when a cry arose for a corpsman. Pharmacist’s Mate Third Class Maurice A. Tellier, an eighteen-year-old sailor from Pawtucket, Rhode Island, already had a reputation for going forward of friendly lines to help the wounded; he quickly volunteered and ventured out to assist. He located a wounded Marine officer and two enlisted men, and although nicked by shrapnel, performed the necessary triage to save their lives. Tellier accompanied his charges back to their unit before having his wounds treated at his own aid station. The young corpsman was recommended for the Navy and Marine Corps Medal; many months later, after his disability discharge, he received the Silver Star Medal.
Aside from harassing artillery fire and Tellier’s heroics, BLT 1-24 avoided contact with the enemy and spent the day in the assembly area. However, they could plainly see the enemy moving about on the high ground ahead – in areas the Army was supposed to be conquering. The Japanese were well within range, and 1Lt. Frederic A. Stott gave voice to their frustration.
All of “D plus 12″ we sat and sat and watched these woods, unable to deliver any effective fire, for every time we requested permission to open up, it was denied on the grounds that the Army was advancing and would soon be occupying that hill. So we sat and watched the Nips flit safely back and forth amongst the trees while our distaste for the terrain grew hourly.[8]
All too soon, BLT 1-24 would return to the Tapochau foothills – and go up against those very same Japanese troops.
[1] Frederic A. Stott, “Saipan Under Fire” (Andover: Frederic Stott, 1945), 12.
[2] Robert L. Williams, “In My Own Words,” interview conducted by Veteran Voices of Pittsburgh, March 12, 2014. Williams was in charge of a demolitions team, and part of his combat load was 20 one-quarter pound blocks of explosive. “Every night, whenever I had it, I would put it up in front of my foxhole for protection. You can shoot at TNT all you want, [to set it off] you need the blasting caps.” The explosive primers, on the other hand, were “temperamental” and handled with extreme care.
[3] “Action Report: First Battalion, 24th Marines Record of Events, 15 June – 9 July 1944″ (24 August 1944), 1. Hereafter BLT 1-24 Report.
[4] John C. Chapin, Breaching the Marianas: The Battle for Saipan (Washington: Marine Corps Historical Center, 1994), 21. Chapin notes that “Nineteen other officers of the 27th Infantry Division were also relieved after the Saipan battle was over, although only one of them had commanded a unit in battle.”
[5] This was a particularly embarrassing episode, as the 105th Infantry was charged with keeping the enemy contained at Saipan’s southern tip. A significant Japanese force sneaked through the American positions and reached the airfield without being detected. The 25th Marines, who were supposed to be in reserve on Hill 500, wound up fighting a fairly serious battle against these intruders and stemmed the tide. An estimated 400 Japanese soldiers were killed in this attack.
[6] The Army unit was nominally the 165th Infantry – minus its Second Battalion, and with the First Battalion, 105th Infantry attached. This is indicative of the fragmented nature of Army dispositions on Saipan, and it is small wonder that units had difficulty working together.
[7] Clifton B. Cates, “Fourth Marine Division Operations Report, Saipan, 15 June to 9 July 1944,” (18 September 1944), 27. Hereafter “4MarDiv Ops Report.”
[8] Stott, 13. In his narrative, Stott evidently conflates the events of June 27 and June 28, as he mentions an assault that, according to both Battalion and Regimental documents, was scheduled for the following day.
Battalion Daily Report
Casualties, Evacuations, Joinings & Transfers
KIA/DOW
WIA & EVAC*
SICK
JOINED
TRANSFERRED
STRENGTH
Out of an original landing strength of 888 officers and men.
* Does not include minor wounds not requiring evacuation from the line.
| Name | Company | Rank | Role | Change | Cause | Disposition |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Mauritz, Herbert Joseph | Able | PFC | Rifleman | Sick | Unknown | Evacuated, destination unknown |
| Stewart, Edward Leroy | Able | Corporal | Squad Leader | Wounded In Action | Blast concussion | Evacuated, destination unknown |
| Tellier, Maurice Arthur | Headquarters | PhM3c | Corpsman | Wounded In Action | Unknown (slight) | Not evacuated |
| Voeltz, Howard Seibert | Able | PFC | Rifleman | Wounded In Action | Unknown (serious) | Evacuated, destination unknown |