BATTLE NARRATIVE
Turned To The East. Saipan: 24 June 1944.
These photographs by Sgt. Theo Hios show Marines preparing for the advance of 24 June.
They will move along the northern coast of Magicienne Bay (see map below) and onto Kagman Peninsula. USMC photos.
Kagman’s flat land and fields were a welcome change after the hills and ridges of central Saipan. The cultivated sugar cane fields that once sustained the farming families of Chacha and Laulau were blackened and leveled, making forward movement fairly simple. There was little tactical value to the peninsula and the Japanese wisely withdrew from the area, husbanding their dwindling forces in the rugged mountains. While BLT 1-24 remained in reserve, their sister battalions found the going relatively easy, “fanning out on the cultivated level ground leading to the cliffs at the tip of Kagman Point,” in the words of 1Lt. Frederic A. Stott. “Few of the enemy had remained on such indefensible ground, and preceded by numerous tanks and a heavy carpet of artillery and rocket fire, our movement was swift.”[1]
Swift, but also cautious. The peninsula was not completely abandoned; small groups of Japanese defenders remained, and every potential obstacle was carefully investigated. An abandoned roadblock outside the town of Laulau held up tank support for nearly four hours, and a flame-throwing tank was disabled by a mine. Munitions were stored in the town itself, and at 1145 a blockhouse exploded, showering Jeep-sized chunks of cement and rebar over an area several hundred feet wide. The blast and falling debris killed or wounded approximately twenty Marines in BLT 2-24.[2]
As the right flank progressed along the shores of Magicienne Bay and along the southern edge of Kagman, the left faced a considerably tougher challenge. Acrimony between leadership in the Army’s 27th Infantry Division and Marine Corps generals was reaching a boiling point. While Stott claimed “whenever we worked directly in conjunction with the Army troops, we had no complaint,” this opinion was by no means universal.[3] RCT-23, in particular, found operations with the soldiers extremely trying and reported as much to 4th Marine Division headquarters. A general flavor of their complaints was recorded in the Division’s operation report, which somewhat disparagingly referred to the Army as “the unit on the left.”
[23 June] RCT-23 initially advanced rapidly over rough terrain… within a half-hour was in possession of Hill 600. It was then discovered that the unit on the Division's left would not be ready to attack for some time….
Contact having been made, the advance was continued until a heavy pocket of resistance… caused RCT 23 to again halt the attack, contact with the unit on the left again being lost. Since the pocket of resistance had been bypassed by the 27th Infantry Division, efforts were made to have it reduced by the responsible unit but were unsuccessful prior to dark….
In order to establish a secure position for the night, the left of RCT 23 was adjusted to make contact with the unit on its left near the original line of departure. The result of the day's operations were lessened by the difficulty in maintaining contact with elements of the 27th Infantry Division….
[24 June] The left was held up by the same center of resistance… which was instrumental in halting the advance of the previous day. The responsibility for its reduction had been assigned to the 27th Infantry Division….
As RCT 23 accelerated its outer perimeter swing, the gap on the Division left increased… Further advance would have been feasible except for the dangerous gap on the left flank that required coverage.[4]
The RCT-23 report was even more pointed.
[23 June] The problem of maintaining contact with the Army and the bypassing of [Target Area] 175O [the strong point] by Army units created several unfavorable situations during the day and generally delayed the progress of the attack along the entire front. Also caused many Marine casualties. Only after repeated reports and request from CT [Combat Team] headquarters to the division was the Army made to take action against 175O.
[24 June] It was considered extremely hazardous to push the assault battalions too far forward of the Army units on the left because of the central ridge in the Army zone of action which dominated the low ground…. Several times during the progress of the attack, troops on the low ground were pinned down by MG, mortar, and AT gun fire from the hills in the Army zone of action.[5]
Incensed by what he perceived as a lack of aggression, the senior Marine commander (General Holland M. Smith) relieved his counterpart (Major General Ralph Smith) of duty, replacing him with Major General Sanderford Jarman. Whether “Howlin’ Mad” Smith had appropriate reason – or appropriate authority – to fire Ralph Smith, was hotly debated.[6] These politics mattered little to the men on the front; delays put their lives at risk, and the old animosity revived with interest. “The [Army] infantry merely held a tea party on our bridgehead while we took 90 per cent of the island,” griped PFC Kenneth E. Imhof of Charlie Company; his opinion, while unfair, was widely shared among Marines on Saipan.[7]
For Imhof and his buddies in BLT 1-24, the rapid movement on the right and slow grind on the left created a gap in the center they had to fill. “Our companies are moving out and will probably be used in center of Regt’l front,” noted the War Diary at 1330; twelve minutes later, “B Co. has been committed.”[8] By 1600, all three companies were back on the front line. Fortunately, the day’s advance was nearly complete and by 1630 the entire regiment was digging in along the O-5A line.[9] They ducked a few short rounds from friendly artillery, and a handful of men received slight wounds. However, these casualties were offset by the return of six previously evacuated Marines, and for the first time in the campaign the battalion ended the day with a net gain in personnel.
Two of the returning men were sorely needed platoon leaders. First Lieutenant Alexander Santilli returned to his role as Charlie Company’s machine gun officer, while 1Lt. Kenneth A. Beehner was assigned to the leaderless 81mm mortar platoon. Neither man was medically cleared for duty. “Al was shell-shocked [on 22 June] and one of his fellow officers carried him back behind the lines, a distance of about two miles,” reported one of “Saint” Santilli’s Fordham classmates. “They planned to evacuate him. The next morning Al got up, dressed, and sneaked back to his outfit. He told them that he wouldn’t let them go through all the fighting while he was taking it easy behind the lines.”[10] Beehner was limping slightly from a gunshot wound to his ankle, but was “patched up” enough to carry on.
The two officers may have marveled at the distance they had to cover to reach their buddies. Overall, the 24th Marines gained 1,200 yards – twelve football fields to college gridiron stars like Santilli and Beehner – and were well on their way to conquering the Kagman Peninsula.
[1] Frederic A. Stott, “Saipan Under Fire” (Andover: Frederic Stott, 1945), 11-12.
[2] This was the second massive explosion experienced by BLT 2-24; in the battle of Roi-Namur, another blockhouse filled with torpedo warheads blew up so violently that it seemed the island would sink.
[3] Stott, 11.
[4] Clifton B. Cates, “Fourth Marine Division Operations Report, Saipan, 15 June to 9 July 1944,” (18 September 1944). Hereafter “4MarDiv Ops Report.”
[5] “Report of RCT-23,”6 September 1944, in Operations Report, 4th Marine Division, Saipan, Annex H (San Diego: Headquarters, 4th Marine Division, 3 October 1944), 41-42.Report, 41-42.
[6] For a concise and thorough explanation of “Smith Versus Smith,” see Philip A. Crowl, Campaign in the Marianas. Available online.
[7] “July Fourth On Saipan ‘Noisy’ Writes Marine,” The Quad City Times (Davenport, IA), 26 July 1944.
[8] “Action Report: First Battalion, 24th Marines Record of Events, 15 June – 9 July 1944″ (24 August 1944), 1. Hereafter BLT 1-24 Report.
[9] “Report of RCT-24,” 28 August 1944, in Operations Report, 4th Marine Division, Saipan, Annex I (San Diego: Headquarters, 4th Marine Division, 3 October 1944), 20. Hereafter RCT 24 Final Report.
[10] Jack Cuddy, “Alex Santilli, Fordham Grid Star, Killed Leading Attack,” The Green Bay Press-Gazette (Green Bay, WI) 18 August 1944.
Battalion Daily Report
Casualties, Evacuations, Joinings & Transfers
KIA/DOW
WIA & EVAC*
SICK
JOINED
TRANSFERRED
STRENGTH
Out of an original landing strength of 888 officers and men.
* Does not include minor wounds not requiring evacuation from the line.
| Name | Company | Rank | Role | Change | Cause | Disposition |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Beehner, Kenneth August | Headquarters | First Lieutenant | 81mm Mortar Officer | Returned To Duty | From hospital | To HQ Company |
| Cable, Raymond Schede | Baker | PFC | Rifleman | Returned To Duty | From hospital | To Baker Company |
| Dunkelberg, James Gordon | Headquarters | FM1c | Field Music | Wounded In Action | Unknown (slight) | Evacuated, destination unknown |
| Hurley, Thomas Milbourne | Able | Corporal | MG Squad Leader | Returned To Duty | From hospital | To Able Company |
| Morrison, John Wilson | Headquarters | PFC | Messenger | Wounded In Action | Unknown (slight) | Not evacuated |
| Osterberg, Leonard John | Charlie | PFC | BARman | Wounded In Action | Unknown (slight) | Evacuated, destination unknown |
| Roche, Daniel Anthony | Headquarters | PFC | Lineman | Wounded In Action | Unknown (slight) | Not evacuated |
| Santilli, Alexander | Charlie | First Lieutenant | Leader, MG Platoon | Returned To Duty | From hospital | To Charlie Company |
| Setina, Thomas Charles | Charlie | Private | Rifleman | Returned To Duty | From hospital | To Charlie Company |
| Siranovich, John Michael | Headquarters | Sergeant | Radio Technician | Returned To Duty | From hospital | To HQ Company |