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BATTLE NARRATIVE

Hold What You Can. Saipan: 18 June 1944

The sun rose over Magicienne Bay, glinting off the blue Pacific water, warming men soaked by the nightly rain, drying out foxholes and turning muddy roads to dust. It foretold another scorching, uncomfortable day in the cane fields, in humidity unlike anything experienced in training. “That hot, muggy, humid, sticky, stinky weather!” complained Sergeant Mike Mervosh. “The weather sometimes took more of a toll on you than anything else, walking in that hot sun. It was tough.”[1] Daylight meant that supplies could finally reach the men atop the cliff, where food, ammunition, and fresh water were eagerly awaited. Water was at a premium, and strict rationing was implemented: one canteen per man, per day.

At BLT 1-24 headquarters at the base of the cliff, 1Lt. Frederic A. Stott assessed the battle’s progress. From incoming reports, he gathered that the Army’s 27th Infantry Division was ashore and assigned to the final capture of Aslito Airfield and points south. “As yet we had not glimpsed any of these reinforcements,” he wrote, “but it was heartening to hear of their presence.” He was more concerned with his own battalion’s situation. “D-plus-three morning showed our strength further depleted and we were unrestored physically,” he noted.[2] More than 180 men were dead or incapacitated – almost twenty percent of those who landed just two days before. The only silver lining was a message from Colonel Franklin Hart directing Lt. Col. Austin R. Brunelli to officially take command of BLT 1-24.[3] Brunelli had proved his worth the previous day, and the battalion would benefit from his leadership in the days ahead.

With the Army now responsible for the southern portion of Saipan, the two Marine divisions could begin a gradual pivot to the north with the intention of cutting the island in half. The ultimate plan for a northward advance envisioned an unbroken line of Marines running laterally from coast to coast, sweeping all resistance before them until they reached Marpi Point at the very northern tip of Saipan. However, there was still a mile of Japanese-occupied ground between the Marines and Magicienne Bay, and the day’s attack order called for the conquering of that territory.

American infantry and tanks approach Aslito Airfield, visible at upper left. Note artillery airbursts and a naval vessel offshore providing fire support. USMC photo.

BLT 1-24 used their morning to move the battalion command post to the top of the cliff and send out small patrols to scout the area ahead. These men reported three or four large Japanese pillboxes and what appeared to be a complex of strong points a few hundred yards beyond the cane fields. One Able Company patrol led by Corporal Vernon D. Rigdon got into a firefight nearly 500 yards ahead of friendly units; Rigdon’s men killed twelve Japanese riflemen and returned to friendly lines with an astonishing 28 prisoners of war.[4]

Those not assigned to patrol duty were “plagued” by all manner of harassing Japanese fire, ranging from mortars and machine guns to the dreaded airbursts from 40mm antiaircraft guns. The latter weapons, firing from distant Nafutan Point, were well out of retaliatory range and it was doubly disconcerting to duck incoming fire from the rear.[5] PFC Chester L. McCoy was watching Japanese soldiers running in and out of a cane field a few hundred yards ahead of him when the barrage started. Shells exploded overhead, “the same as a grenade going off in the ground, but in the air.” The best protection against airbursts was to stand up – lying prone made one a bigger target for shrapnel directly above – so McCoy wedged himself up against a brick outhouse. Five pieces of shrapnel drove into his hip. “That was the last of me on the island. I was knocked out temporarily – a corpsman got to me, put me on a stretcher and carried me back to the CP, where I stayed until they could take me to the beach.”[6]

A Marine patrol investigates Japanese positions. USMC photo.

On his way to the aid station, McCoy might have seen a trio of strangers approaching the command post. A Marine officer – 2Lt. Jim G. Lucas of the PR section – led the way for correspondents Frank Kelley and Robert Sherrod. Sherrod, whose reporting on the battle of Tarawa made national news (and a best-selling book) came ashore with the 6th Marines and was making a tour of other sectors. Here, “on the last hillside but one until the island was crossed,” he pulled out his notebook and jotted down his impressions.

We stopped in the 1/24 CP where Lieut. Col. Austin R. Brunelli had just taken command of the battalion from Major Robert N. Fricke....The battalion had had 210 casualties, about one-fourth of its strength, but only 27 were dead. Destroyers were firing air bursts over a cornfield 1,000 yards to the north. Sometimes the shells burst 200 feet above the ground, sometimes only 50 feet. They drenched the field with fragmented steel until no Japs could have stayed above ground and lived. But the Japs long ago learned to get underground.[7]
Robert Sherrod
Combat Correspondent

While the line companies scouted objectives and HQ talked to the reporters, Lieutenant Stott was preparing for his second day as an armor liaison. The Marine medium tanks were needed elsewhere, but the Army LVTAs were still positioned on the flatland, flinging shells at the airfield. At around 1000, the 165th Infantry overran Aslito Airfield and the tankers turned their attention to the cliff, shooting up targets pointed out by Marine units still making the climb.[8]

Stott used his officer’s prerogative to commandeer a gunner’s position “for diversion… and managed to sandwich in some enjoyable machine gun firing.” His confidence and bravado nearly got the best of him.

Once when the troops on top seemed to be lagging, I climbed out on top of the tank and semaphored to find out the cause for delay. After considerable wig-wagging, we received an answer so I climbed back in and resumed firing. It wasn’t until we pulled back out, the motors were cut, and we could talk again, that another tankman pointed out three bullet marks on my protective gun shield where a sniper had barely missed his target. From then on, I semaphored less conspicuously.[9]
As the easternmost unit on the 4th Marine Division line, the 25th Marines had the toughest job of the morning. Rough ground and determined Japanese troops kept them from reaching the O-2 line the previous day, and they had to punch through those obstacles before other units could proceed. As the 25th Marines advanced, C/1/24 – the unit immediately to their left – began moving forward as well. At noon, LtCol. Brunelli ordered Baker Company to stand fast; as the right wing of the Division line continued to move and the distance between Charlie and Baker Companies inevitably widened, Brunelli had Captain Irving Schechter‘s Able Company fill the gap, platoon by platoon. Baker Company served as a pivot point, and as the line extended the battalion gradually faced towards the left – or north – before moving forward into in the cane fields.[10] If competed successfully, this maneuver would effectively cut Saipan in half.[11]
Looking north to Magicienne Bay. High ground across the water is the eastern tip of Kagman Peninsula. USMC photo.

“Move out and take objectives."

The terrain ahead was largely flat, with a gentle slope downwards to Magicienne Bay. A small road, a railway, and power lines led to the north, skirting around a low hill on the way to the hamlet of Tsutsuuran. A much larger elevation, soon to be known as “Hill 500,” loomed in the distance (TA 151GH below). The Marines advanced with caution; even on flat ground, hidden pillboxes and spider traps held nasty surprises. “Opposition was sporadic,” noted Lieutenant Stott, “but locating and eliminating the Japs in the cane was a difficult, dangerous job which held down the rate of progress.” Tank-infantry cooperation was the name of the game; after finding a road to the top of the cliff, the LVTAs were now rolling along with the 4th Marine Division.[12]
Detail of the BLT 1-24 area of operations, 18 June 1944.

The Japanese forces in the area may have put up “sporadic” resistance overall, but in some areas the fighting grew quite fierce. On the left of the BLT 1-24 sector, Baker Company hit a hot spot of sniper fire; within five minutes they were calling for tank support. The LVTAs were getting good at cane field fighting, and with their assistance the threat was neutralized. As the pivoting maneuver neared completion, LtCol. Brunelli set his objectives for a general advance. He ordered “B Co. mission for tonight left flank on RJ  [Road Junction] 288,” – Target Area 145S on the tactical map – with the rest of his companies extending to the coastline.

A combined tank-infantry attack jumped off at 1530 hours and almost immediately ran into trouble. Heavy mortar fire from the south – behind Marine lines – started raining down, pinning Able Company in an open field for nearly half an hour.[13] The long-range fire was inaccurate and casualties were light, but the exhausted Marines were finding it harder and harder to keep moving. “We didn’t sleep for three days and nights,” commented PFC Tommy Lynchard of Able Company. “We were so tired. Once I fell asleep while being pinned down in a sugarcane field by machine gun fire, cane falling all around me.”[14] A stern order from Lt. Col. Brunelli – “All companies move out and take objectives” – got the men moving, but did not stop the mortars.. Several concentrations fell on BLT 1-24 in the first hour of the attack, culminating in the destruction of a hospital jeep and a crew of stretcher bearers at 1630.[15]

For Mike Mervosh, the uncertainty of harassing fire was more troubling than a constant rain of shells.

The Japs had set their mortars to hit all the main roads and clearings, or any approach the Marines might use. We did not take a lot of direct hits, but there was a lot of terror that came from being near a mortar blast or shell burst, especially when we didn't know where they were coming from. My gun teams had to leapfrog forward, one team at a time while the others fired toward the enemy to keep them low while we took cover in bunkers, rock ledges, and anything that would protect us from the onslaught above. It was a horrifying experience…. We just never knew where the rounds were coming from, and that is a terrifying feeling to know such danger is a constant threat and not have any idea how to avoid it.[16]
Some of the infantrymen thought the fire was directed at the LVTAs. When the armor first appeared, “we thought that all we had to do was follow the tank, get in the back of the tank and we’re safe,” said PFC Edward Curylo. “Hell, that lasted about a day or so. All of the artillery shells and the mortar shells, everything was being fired at the tank. After a day or two, uh uh! We stayed way back.”[17] When BLT 1-24 reached their objective and started consolidating for the evening, the Army tankers turned around and headed for the rear to rearm and refuel.
Marine infantry operating with an Army LVTA-4. USMC photo.

“Hold what you can, where you can."

The Japanese, it seemed, were waiting for such an opportunity.

Tsutsuuran, according to the best intelligence available, was occupied by elements of four Japanese infantry companies – reserve units of the 47th Independent Mixed Brigade – and three companies of the 9th Tank Regiment. Colonel Takashi Goto’s men sacrificed many lives and 31 of their 44 tanks in a fierce but ultimately futile attack on the 2nd Marine Division on D+1. It was the first time massed Japanese tanks squared off against Marine infantry and artillery, and instead of scoring a breakthrough, Goto received a thorough defeat. The survivors returned to Tsutsuuran, licked their wounds and wait for another chance to strike.

Abandoned Type 97 Chi-Ha tank, Saipan. The main gun has been removed.
Abandoned Type 95 Ha-Go light tank near Garapan, Saipan.

The 9th Tank Regiment was equipped with a mixture of light (Type 95 Ha-Go) and medium (Type 97 Chi-Ha) tanks. While neither was a head-on match for an American M4, both models could be dangerous to LVTAs, and deadly to unsupported infantry. Neither BLT 1-24 nor BLT 2-24 carried anti-tank weapons more powerful than a bazooka, and the men who carried these portable rocket launchers had more experience shooting at fortifications than vehicles. They were terribly vulnerable without armor support, and the Japanese tank-infantry counterattack – whether launched by design or by chance – hit them at the worst possible time.

BLT 1-24 first received reports of enemy tanks coming up a beach road in Target Area 146M. There was an immediate scramble for cover. PFC Tommy Lynchard said the Japanese tanks “roared about in mad circles” and admitted, “I was plenty scared.”[18] Japanese machine guns deployed in buildings raked Baker Company’s line, causing numerous casualties. Captain Milton Cokin radioed for artillery support at 1717 hours; two minutes later, the Japanese broke through his company. Brunelli was quick to respond. “Draw back and reorganize when you can,” he ordered at 1721. “Tanks and halftracks being sent up as fast as possible.” Seven minutes later: “Reestablish front line and hold what you can, where you can.”[19] The Regimental Weapons Company was alerted to the threat but needed some time to respond. For now, the infantrymen were on their own. While the Japanese infantry came in close, the tanks held position about 350 yards – the very edge of effective bazooka range – and sprayed the Marines with machine gun and cannon fire.[20]

The LVTAs were also in serious trouble, as a hidden anti-tank gun started picking them off with unnerving accuracy. Lieutenant Stott, still in his gunner’s position, had his second narrow escape from death.

[We] were returning with open hatches when the fire commenced, so the hatches slammed shut instantly. The shooting was top-notch, and with the first three rounds, three amphibious tanks in a row suffered hits and stopped. Ours, the third in line, was struck in the back, disabled, and set ablaze. Given the word by the tank commander to abandon the tank, we flipped open the hatches and leaped, all in one motion, and despite what seemed like a hail of machine gun bullets we landed safely in a ditch. Weaponless all, we took turns running from cover to cover, and by these short dashes we eventually made our way to safety.

It was Stott’s last ride in a tank for the rest of the battle. He would later receive the Navy Cross for his service as a liaison officer on 17-18 June.

A trio of knocked-out LVTA-4 amphibious tanks, Saipan.
As heavy automatic weapons fire reverberated from the front lines, Stott rejoined the battalion command post, “where several liberal doses of Doc [Richard C.] Porter’s Nipponese whiskey proved a quick restorer.” As he sipped, he listened in on the frantic conversations and orders swirling around the CP. “The incoming reports were many, vague, and indicative of confusion,” he noted. “Some of these messages indicated a casualty rate in some of the companies which, if true, meant that only a handful remained of those who had landed three days earlier.”[21] He may have heard a worrying exchange between Cokin and Brunelli:

1717: “B” Co requests heavy artillery fire on 152B. [Road Junction 289, Tsutsuuran]
1719: “B” Co line broken, fell back; machine guns set up in house – heavy casualties.
1728: Reestablish front line and hold what you can (“B” Co) where you can.
1735: B Co requests artillery 124I. [Far to the rear; maps indicate Japanese artillery emplacements here]
1737: B Co ordered to move forward and gain contact with G Co. Engineers will assist [with] 2 platoons. Wide gap between B and G Cos.
1738: B Co reports only 40 men left.[22]

In this chaos the battalion corpsmen were pushed to their limits, and some responded with outstanding gallantry. Baker Company withered under the merciless hail machine gun and 37mm fire from Japanese tanks was merciless, and “in the period of a few minutes many casualties were suffered.” A teenaged corpsman, HA1c Anthony Marquez, stepped up to the challenge. “With complete disregard for his own personal safety, Marquez immediately and unhesitatingly went forward and began administering first aid to the wounded,” wrote one officer. Although the tanks were shooting directly at his position and the situation was “desperate,” Marquez was the picture of poise as he “calmly and efficiently treated and directed the evacuation of the casualties.” The brave young man was recommended for a medal.[23]
HA1c Marquez

Charlie Company was hit, too. Corporal Horace F.  Allen, Jr., a flamethrower operator, saw PFC Robert G. Thompson fall wounded just before something blew up in his face, burning him around the eyes. “Thompson got hit, and we had to fall back,” he recalled. “I don’t know that anybody got to him – I was just about blind by that point, anyway.”[24] Sergeant Mike Mervosh recalled having to “hit the deck to avoid being shot” and the bravery of the infantrymen who tried to take on the tanks with grenades and satchel charges.[25] American artillery finally got the range on the enemy armor; the heavy shells, aided by the determined fire of the bazookamen, finally chased the tanks away.[26]

Marines pose with destroyed Chi-Ha and Ha-Go tanks, Saipan. They have removed a machine gun from one of the vehicles.

An unknown number of Japanese infantry managed to exploit the break in the line and fell upon the vulnerable support units. The 81mm mortar platoon suddenly found itself under rifle fire from a nearby cane field. With both platoon officers gone, the men were temporarily leaderless.[27] The NCO in charge went to pieces when faced by this new crisis. PFC John C. Pope was shocked to see the sergeant “crouched down against a tree stump with his knees tucked under his chin and his arms locked around his legs. Tears were running down his cheeks and he was trembling as he mumbled something about being killed.” Pope’s surprise quickly turned to disgust. “I felt like shooting the son-of-a-bitch. The way things were going, it looked real bad for us. We might be overrun and slaughtered.”

Sergeant Woodrow Barfield, a section leader, took charge. The normally soft-spoken Southerner “started to shout orders in a voice none of us had ever heard from him before,” recalled Pope. “Instantly, every man responded, and we were a bunch of fighting Marines.” Mortarmen picked up their carbines, and the security force opened fire with their heavy machine guns. Charging Japanese soldiers fell in heaps; the survivors melted back into the cane field, leaving the dead and wounded behind. PFC William H. Skeens, an ammo carrier from Bloomingdale, New Jersey, jumped out of his gun pit to give chase and accounted for several adversaries with his quick-firing carbine. John Pope, PFC Robert Sherrill, and a handful of others followed Skeens across the open ground and stood side by side shooting into the cane field.

4th Division Marines chase after Japanese troops in a cane field. USMC photo by Nick Ragus.

One of the Japanese soldiers was feigning death. He jumped to his feet and fired a single shot, knocking Billy Skeens to the ground. Pope and Sherrill riddled the man, then turned to their buddy. Skeens was stone dead; the Japanese bullet had pierced his heart. The survivors vengefully set the cane field on fire and carried the fallen Marine back to the command post.[28] The headquarters personnel of another battalion were streaming rearward, and those of BLT 1-24 – including the mortar platoon – followed suit. Night was falling when they reached a more defensible position some 300 yards to the rear, forming a “combined two-battalion command post which had no true or clear picture of the front, and which itself had little organization until well after dark.”[29]

Dozens of wounded men were cut off from a fully equipped aid station. Pharmacist’s Mate Second Class Francis B. Munski, the 81mm platoon corpsman, applied his “extreme ingenuity” to the situation and set up a one-man triage area. Munski, a former rancher from Montana, had previously distinguished himself by caring for seriously wounded Marines after the battle of Namur. Working alone and on his own initiative, Munski treated dozens of casualties and prepared them for evacuation, little caring whether they belonged to his battalion or not.[30] He would later receive the Legion of Merit for his endeavors.

At the end of the day, the companies of BLT 1-24 were tied in together but there were troubling gaps on both flanks. If the Japanese decided to mount another strong counterattack, these could be easily exploited – and the battalion turned back in a rout. American artillery heavily shelled the Japanese-held area; this, plus losses inflicted during the day, prevented any coordinated attack against BLT 1-24. As always, though, individual incidents caused moments of terror throughout the night.

John Pope had two problems on his mind. The constant action of the last few days wore down the notoriously fragile firing pin in his M1917 machine gun; it finally broke, and Pope was out of action until it could be replaced. Fortunately, he carried several spares in his pocket for just such an occasion, and “spent countless boring training hours practicing how to change one in a matter of seconds, even while blindfolded.” Pope pulled the bolt and held it carefully aloft – any dirt might cause a jam – while he shook out the broken firing pin and reached for a new one.

John C. Pope

As he worked, Pope kept half an eye on his other concern – his new foxhole buddy, Bobby Sherrill. The two Marines knew each other well after eighteen months in the same unit, but had never spent the night in the same defensive position. A foxhole buddy was more than a friend – he was the guy your life depended on, who you trusted implicitly to watch your back no matter what. Sherrill and Billy Skeens were foxhole buddies, but Skeens was now dead. Pope’s buddy was also out of action aboard a hospital ship somewhere.

Now the two were paired up: Pope behind the Browning, and Sherrill on guard with a shotgun. Each was watching the other carefully, gauging reactions, determining levels of trust.

Robert Sherrill

Pope was just about to insert the new firing pin when a Japanese soldier materialized just a few feet in front of the gun. “He had a wild, scary look and murder on his mind,” said Pope. “Since I was behind the gun, I was his target.” The Japanese soldier brandished a bayonetted rifle and screamed “Banzai!” Pope stood up, tripped, and fell over on his back. “For a second I thought I was going to have a bayonet through my chest, so I doubled up my knees to protect myself.” Even in this reflex action, Pope held the bolt and firing pin out of the dirt. A thought flashed through his mind: Bobby, pay attention!

Bobby turned around and fired the shotgun, almost touching the man with the end of the barrel. When that buckshot hit him that close, he changed directions all right, thank the LORD. I still have an image in my mind of him going backward in the shape of a horseshoe. The full charge had hit him in the stomach and lifted him completely out of my sight.

I remember yelling at Bobby, “What took you so long?” If that man had decided to pull the trigger instead of using the bayonet on me, I would not be alive now.[31]

PFC John C. Pope
HQ/1/24th Marines

“We were an exhausted battalion, far under strength, and temporarily incapable of accomplishing impressive results,” noted Fred Stott in a glum assessment of D-plus-3. “Our exertions had worn us out, and time and rest were needed for the creation of a new reservoir of reserve strength. Our ‘first wind’ was gone, and the adjustment had not been made for the continuation of the attack, either physically or mentally.”[32]

The next day would bring some badly needed relief.

Previous Day

Table Of Contents

Next Day

Footnotes

[1] Mike Mervosh, oral history interview conducted by The National World War II Museum, “Oral History Part 1,” March 19, 2008.
[2] Frederic A. Stott, “Saipan Under Fire” (Andover: Frederic Stott, 1945), 7.
[3] Carl W. Hoffman, Saipan: The Beginning of the End (Washington: Historical Division, US Marine Corps, 1950), 96.
[4] “Ar-La-Tex Men With The Colors,” The Shreveport Times (Shreveport, LA), 18 April 1945. Rigdon was decorated with a Bronze Star for this patrol. Interestingly, while the citation specifies the number of prisoners, no mention of POWs was made in the battalion’s diary.
[5] Henry I. Shaw, Bernard C. Nalty, and Edwin T. Turnbladh, History of U. S. Marine Corps Operations in World War II, Vol. III: Central Pacific Drive (Historical Branch: G-3 Division, Headquarters, USMC, 1966), 290.
[6] Chester L. McCoy, oral history interview conducted by Charles Lanier, Chester L. McCoy Collection (AFC/2001/001/87486), Veterans History Project, American Folklife Center, Library of Congress.
[7] Robert Sherrod, On To Westward: War in the Central Pacific (New York: Duell, Sloan and Pearce, 1945), 71. Lucas was well familiar with BLT 1-24, having spent time with them on the voyage to Saipan. Presumably, this visit was when he learned of the death of Sergeant Frank A. Tucker and gathered the information for his article about Tucker’s death. Lucas’ casualty report is probably based on information available to the battalion at the time.
[8] Stott is not specific about where the tanks were, saying only “we furnished heavy fire support on the cliff while units of infantry advanced along the sugar cane covered field on top.” (“Saipan Under Fire,” 7). They were probably working with BLT 1-25, which had the unenviable task of neutralizing bypassed Japanese positions at the southern end of the cliff.
[9] Stott, 6.
[10] “Action Report: First Battalion, 24th Marines Record of Events, 15 June – 9 July 1944″ (24 August 1944). Hereafter BLT 1-24 Report.
[11] Hoffman, 102.
[12] Stott, 7.
[13] The Battalion War Diary thought this mortar fire originated at Nafutan Point, the very southern tip of Saipan.
[14] Tommy Lynchard, unpublished personal papers. Author’s collection.
[15] BLT 1-24 Report.
[16] Gregg Stoner, Hardcore Iron Mike, Conqueror of Iwo Jima (Bloomington: iUniverse, 2015), 44.
[17] Edward Curylo, oral history interview conducted by Brian Louwers (4 December 2013), Edward Curylo Collection (AFC/2001/001/94115), Veterans History Project, American Folklife Center, Library of Congress.
[18] Lynchard papers. This number is a very high estimate; it is doubtful the Japanese had 29 operational tanks left on Saipan by this time.
[19] BLT 1-24 Report.
[20] Hoffman, 102.
[21] Stott, 8.
[22] BLT 1-24 Report.
[23] “Doc” Marquez was recommended for the Bronze Star; he received the Navy and Marine Corps Medal instead.
[24] Horace Allen, interview with the author, 7 August 2015. Allen was positive that Thompson was hit on D+3, as this was Allen’s last day with the company. However, Thompson is not recorded as “missing in action” until 25 June, a full week later. Keeping track of casualties during heavy combat was extremely difficult, and there are numerous instances of clerks playing “catch up” in quiet periods, which results in conflicting information. Officially, Thompson’s MIA date is 25 June.
[25] Stoner, 45. Of battling tanks on Saipan, Mervosh states: “Two of my best men died while trying to take out an enemy tank that had broken through. Sergeant Albert T. Burnowsi and Corporal Eugene T. Gladkowski approached the enemy tank and used hand grenades and a satchel charge to blow the tracks off the tank. The explosion stopped the tank where it sat. The loss of those two great Marines made my men and me become all the harder with their deaths.” The accuracy of this memory is questionable: Gladkowski, a mortarman, died on Iwo Jima; there is no “Sergeant Albert Burnowsi” or any similar name on unit muster rolls.
[26] Hoffman, 102.
[27] The senior platoon leader, 1Lt. Waldo C. Lincoln was wounded in action on 17 June. 1Lt. James R. Donovan, the assistant platoon leader, suffered mortal wounds on 15 June and died aboard a hospital ship on 18 June.
[28] John C. Pope, Angel On My Shoulder, Kindle eBook.William Skeens received a posthumous Silver Star Medal for gallantry in defending his mortar position against this counterattack.
[29] Stott, 8. Stott is not clear about the identity of the other battalion’s CP, but it was likely BLT 2-24. Interestingly, he notes that the withdrawal of the 81mm mortars was due to “a misunderstood order.”
[30] A commendation in Hospital Quarterly gives the number of patients as 35; a contemporary news report of Munski’s decoration claims 57.
[31] Pope, Angel On My Shoulder.
[32] Stott, 9.

Battalion Daily Report

Casualties, Evacuations, Joinings & Transfers
0

KIA/DOW

0

WIA & EVAC*

0

SICK

0

JOINED

0

TRANSFERRED

0

STRENGTH

Out of an original landing strength of 888 officers and men.
* Does not include minor wounds not requiring evacuation from the line.
NameCompanyRankRoleChangeCauseDisposition
Adams, William JosephCharlieGunnery SergeantGunnery SergeantWounded In ActionShrapnel, left heelEvacuated to USS Bountiful
Allen, Horace Frank Jr.CharlieCorporalFlamethrowerWounded In ActionBurns, both eyesEvacuated, destination unknown
Boylan, Kenneth LaverneAblePFCRiflemanWounded In ActionShrapnel, left jawEvacuated to USS Solace
Brahm, PaulCharlieCorporalFire Team LeaderWounded In ActionBlast concussionEvacuated, destination unknown
Brunelli, Austin RogerHeadquartersLieutenant ColonelBattalion COJoinedFrom 24th Marines HQTo Headquarters Company
Chambers, Leslie Morris Jr.BakerCorporalMortarmanKilled In ActionShrapnel, left shoulderRemoved for burial
Curylo, EdwardBakerPFCFire Team LeaderWounded In ActionGunshot, cheekEvacuated, destination unknown
Donovan, James RichardHeadquartersFirst LieutenantAsst. 81mm OfficerDied Of WoundsGunshot, abdomen (15 June)Died aboard USS Pierce; buried at sea
Eckert, Everett Harry JohnBakerPFCMachine GunnerWounded In ActionGunshot, left handEvacuated, destination unknown
Felicia, Francis GordonHeadquartersHA1cCorpsmanWounded In ActionUnknown (serious)Evacuated, destination unknown
Gabourie, Robert KennethBakerPFCBARmanWounded In ActionShrapnel, left legNot evacuated
Halligan, Robert MaxBakerPFCBARmanWounded In ActionGunshot, left buttocksEvacuated, destination unknown
Hottel, William Henry Jr.HeadquartersPFCScoutWounded In ActionGunshot, right armEvacuated, destination unknown
Joyce, Clyde HiltonBakerPFCBARmanWounded In ActionShrapnel, abdomenEvacuated, destination unknown
Judice, Ripley GeorgeBakerCorporalFire Team LeaderWounded In ActionCompound fracture, right ulnaEvacuated, destination unknown
Kerr, Thomas Moore Jr.HeadquartersFirst LieutenantCommunications OfficerWounded In ActionUnknown (slight)Not evacuated
King, Clifford JamesCharliePFCRiflemanKilled In ActionGrenade explosionRemoved for burial
Lewis, James AlbertBakerPFCBARmanKilled In ActionGunshot, right sideRemoved for burial
Martin, Frederick CharlesBakerPFCBARmanWounded In ActionGunshot, right shoulderEvacuated to USS Solace
McCarthy, Robert JosephBakerPFCBasicWounded In ActionLaceration, right handEvacuated to USS Solace
McCoy, Chester LawrenceBakerPFCRiflemanWounded In ActionShrapnel, left hipEvacuated to USS Solace
Montoya, Gilbert EugeneBakerPFCBARmanWounded In ActionCompound fracture, mandibleEvacuated to USS Solace
Murguia, ManuelBakerPFCMessengerWounded In ActionGunshot, abdomenEvacuated, destination unknown
Nadler, Robert FrederickBakerCorporalFire Team LeaderWounded In ActionGunshot, lumbar regionEvacuated, destination unknown
Norton, Patrick WilliamBakerPFCAmmo CarrierWounded In ActionGunshot, left armEvacuated, destination unknown
Pitoniak, Michael EdwardBakerPFCMachine GunnerWounded In ActionGunshot, left armEvacuated, destination unknown
Reichenbacher, William FrancisCharliePFCRiflemanWounded In ActionShrapnel, left eyeEvacuated to USS James O'Hara
Reynolds, Francis JohnBakerPFCBARmanKilled In ActionUnknown"Remains unknown"
Rieker, Henry JacobBakerPFCRiflemanWounded In ActionUnknown (slight)Evacuated to USS Cambria
Roquet, Leon Henry Jr.AbleCorporalRiflemanReturned To DutyFrom hospitalTo Able Company
Rossel, Frank PeytonBakerCorporalAmmo NCOWounded In ActionMultiple shrapnel woundsEvacuated, destination unknown
Rudyk, StephenCharliePFCBARmanWounded In ActionBlast concussionEvacuated, destination unknown
Ryan, Francis JudeHeadquartersPFCAmmo CarrierWounded In ActionLaceration, right handEvacuated, destination unknown
Schott, Carl FrancisAbleSergeantGuide, 2 PlatoonWounded In ActionMultiple shrapnel woundsEvacuated, destination unknown
Schultz, William MoeBakerPFCMessengerWounded In ActionPsychoneurosisEvacuated to USS Solace
Shearin, James BrooksBakerPFCBARmanWounded In ActionCompound fracture, 5th metatarsalEvacuated to USS Solace
Shemansky, Stanley PaulCharlieCorporalFire Team LeaderReturned To DutyFrom "missing" statusTo Charlie Company
Skeens, William HarryHeadquartersPFCAmmo CarrierKilled In ActionGunshot, chestRemoved for burial
Tackett, EverettBakerPFCFire Team LeaderWounded In ActionShrapnel, right shoulder & psychoneurosisEvacuated, destination unknown
Thomas, Ellis WileyBakerCorporalRiflemanKilled In ActionGunshot, back of headRemoved for burial
Thorne, Lawrence Joshua Jr.BakerCorporalFire Team LeaderWounded In ActionUnknown (serious)Evacuated, destination unknown
Vasey, Ralph ArthurBakerPFCRiflemanWounded In ActionBlast concussionEvacuated to USS Pinkney
Watkins, Robert ErnestBakerPFCBARmanWounded In ActionUnknown (slight)Evacuated to USS Solace

Taps

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